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ABSTRACT: Clifford Williams has recently argued that 
the dispute between A- and B-theories, or tensed and 
tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the 
confusions between the two theories are cleared away 
there is no real metaphysical difference between them. 
The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams's thesis. 
I argue that there are important metaphysical differences 
between the two theories and that, moreover, some of 
the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest 
that he is sympathetic with a B-theoretic ontology. 
1"1 n a recent and provocative paper, "The Metaphysics of A- and B-Time," 
Clifford Williams (1996b) has posed a challenge to those who hold either an 
A-theory or a B-theory oftime. The challenge is to explain just how these two 
theories differ, for, according to Williams, once the misinterpretations of the 
theories are cleared away there is no longer any coherent way of stating what 
differentiates them. Although there is much that is valuable in Williams's 
indistinguishability argument, he is mistaken when he claims that the tradi-
tional issue between A- and B-theories is a pseudo problem. What I think he 
should have claimed, and to some extent has shown, is that there really is only 
one kind of time, namely B-time, since when the B-theory is correctly under-
stood, it will be seen to be adequate to our experience of the passage of time, 
self-consistent, and true. 
Clearly, any full defense of B-time lies outside of the scope of this paper.! 
My aims, therefore, are much more limited. I shall attempt to show, contrary to 
Williams's main thesis, that there is, or rather are, coherent ways of stating 
what differentiates the two theories. I shall proceed by first pointing out a 
strong prima facie ground for believing that a distinction between the two 
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theories exists. Then, after discussing Williams's reasons for claiming that 
there is no difference between A- and B-time, I shall explain what I take the 
differences between the two theories to be. Finally, I shall briefly consider 
reasons for suggesting that Williams's views are supportive of the B-theory. 
My first argument against Williams is that if we accept his thesis that A-
and B-theories are indistinguishable, then seemingly absurd consequences 
follow. To see why, note that Williams treats A-theorists as a relatively mono-
lithic group, even though there are a variety of different versions of A-time. 
Traditionally, defenders of A-time have maintained that in addition to tempo-
ral (B-) relations of earlier, later, and simultaneity, events exemplify the 
monadic temporal (A-) properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity (see 
Gale, 1968, and Smith, 1993). There are other tensers who accept A-properties 
as primitive, but maintain that B-relations are elimininable from an adequate 
ontology of time since they can be analyzed in terms of A-properties and the 
passage of time. I interpret McTaggart's (1908) positive theory of time to be 
of this ilk.2 Still other defenders of the A-theory reject tensed properties and 
temporal relations and countenance only (present) tensed facts (Prior, 1968). 
Further variations of the A-theory emerge when its proponents attempt to 
avoid McTaggart's paradox. Thus John Bigelow (1991) has recently attempted 
to avoid McTaggart's apparent inconsistency in attributing to an event in-
compatible A-properties by relativizing tensed properties not to times, but to 
possible worlds. At one point in his musings about time, George Schlesinger 
(1980) sought to avoid McTaggart's conundrum by appealing to a second 
time dimension; and Smith's (1993) way out implies an allegedly nonvicious 
infinite regress of presentness inhering in its own inherences. There are other 
versions of the A-theory, some of which reject the moving NOW, as well as 
both tensed properties and Prior-type theories (see Zeilicovici, 1994; Tooley, 
1997; and Lowe, 1998). 
On the face of it, therefore, we have a variety of different versions of 
temporal passage. But if Williams's thesis were correct, and A-time is indistin-
guishable from B-time, then all of these different versions of A-time would be 
metaphysically indistinguishable from B-time, and so metaphysically indis-
tinguishable from each other. Since these consequences are absurd, we can 
infer that Williams's main thesis, from which they follow, is mistaken. 
Having made this argument, I must confess that I do not regard it as consti-
tuting a decisive objection to Williams's thesis. For in reply, Williams might 
very well claim that he regards my seemingly absurd consequence (that the 
different A-theories are indistinct) more as a statement of his thesis than as an 
objection to it. Thus more needs to be done to undermine Williams's position. 
Specifically, I must explain what are the metaphysical differences between 
the two positions. I think the best way to do that is by asking why Williams 
thinks that there are no metaphysical differences between A- and B-time. 
Williams argues that there are two ambiguities in the way in which the 
debate between the A- and B-theories has usually been couched, and once 
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these ambiguities are cleared away only one conception of time will remain. 
First, it is claimed that whereas a defender of A-time believes in objective 
temporal passage, or temporal becoming, defenders of B-time deny it. How-
ever, Williams argues that this way of understanding the dispute is ambigu-
ous and leads to a misconstrual of B-time. A-theorists take the B-theorist 
denial of passage to be tantamount to a denial that "time contains any transi-
tion or succession or 'movement' from time to time" (372). Thus A-theorists 
who believe that time contains succession reject the B-theory. To interpret 
the B-theorist denial of passage in this way is, according to Williams, to fall 
prey to the misinterpretation of the B-series as a simultaneous whole, or totem 
simul, in which all of the parts of a four-dimensional space-time exist at once. 
On the other hand, if B-time does contain succession or 'movement' from time 
to time, then the question arises "how can we differentiate it from passage in 
A-time?" (372). 
Williams is correct in saying that it is a misinterpretation to claim that the 
terms of the B-series exist all at once. Where he goes wrong, and thereby 
perpetuates his own belief that there is no difference between A- and B-time, 
is in maintaining that in order for there to be time there must be "passage," 
"transition," or "movement from time to time." For here he is assuming that 
the preanalytic language we use to talk about time and the beliefs we have 
about time, are tantamount to a metaphysical analysis of time itself. In order 
to talk and communicate about time there must be tensed expressions that 
reflect time's passing, but, according to the B-theorist, it does not follow that 
the correct ontology of time must contain transition, temporal passage, or 
flow. 3 The rock-bottom feature of time that must be accepted on all sides is 
that there is change, and the different views concerning the nature of change 
constitute the difference between A- and B-theories of time. To assert that for 
time to be real there must be succession (i.e., temporal relations) or (as if they 
are equivalent) movement or transition from time to time, already assumes 
that there is no difference between A- and B-time. For, as we shall see below, 
on some versions of the metaphysics of A-time (for example, presentism) 
temporal relations do not exist, and on all versions of the metaphysics of B-
theory there is no movement, transition, or temporal passage understood as 
something beyond that to be found in B-relations. 
A-theorists' misunderstanding of the B-theory is further suggested by the 
second way of drawing the distinction between the two theories. It is often 
claimed that whereas A-time holds that only the present exists or is real, in B-
time all events are ontologically on a par, being equally real. Williams says 
that this way of drawing the distinction is ambiguous since it suggests that 
the B-theory must deny that events cease to exist or come into existence, and 
so deny that there is any transition in time. Once again, he says that to mis-
construe B-time in this way is to attribute to the B-theory the view that "all of 
time exists 'simultaneously' as a sort of four-dimensional solid in the space-
time continuum'" (373).4 However, once these ways of distinguishing the two 
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theories are separated from their misconstruals, the difference between A- and 
B-time must be that there are two different kinds of transition: A-transition 
and B-transition. In that case, Williams says that "it is no longer apparent how 
the two theories differ" (375). 
It appears, however, that once again it is Williams who has confused our 
ordinary way of speaking about time with the various metaphysical analyses 
that are claimed to underlie them. We may admit, as assuredly is the case, that 
all events in B-time do not exist simultaneously. But it does not follow from 
that, nor do detensers believe, that in order for there to be time there must be 
some basic unanalyzable concept of coming into existence and ceasing to 
exist. On the B-theory, expressions that assert the coming into existence and 
ceasing to exist of events are eliminable in terms of expressions that state 
their truth conditions. In short, an ontologically adequate representation of 
time will not contain expressions that reflect the coming into existence and 
ceasing to exist of events over and above their tenseless location at different 
dates. Nevertheless, in ordinary language and thought, sentences that assert 
that events do not yet exist, or have come into existence or have ceased to 
exist, are meaningful, necessary for practical purposes, and often true. 
According to Williams, not only have A-theorists misunderstood B-time, 
but B-theorists have misunderstood A-time. The way in which B-theorists 
have misunderstood A-time is by thinking of temporal passage as something 
extra, added to, and over and above, succession in B-time. That is, B-theorists 
have construed the A-theory to be holding that time consists of the property 
of presentness moving along an ordered B-series of moments or events. Wil-
liams claims that this misinterpretation of A-time by B-theorists leads them to 
reject the A-theory because it renders A-time "incomprehensible," "absurd," 
and "contradictory because it is the movement of time in time" (376). Will-
iams goes on to claim that although A-theorists "sometimes convey the idea 
that time consists of some literal unexplainable motion, what they really 
want to convey is that the passage involved in A-time is different from the 
transition involved in B-time" (376; emphasis added). 
It seems to me, however, that it is Williams who misinterprets the A-theory 
and reveals his B-theorist bias when he claims that A-theorists do not really 
want to claim that "presentness is a property of events over and above their 
occurrence at particular clock times, a property that events gain and lose" 
(376). There obviously are leading A-theorists who maintain, and argue vig-
orously for, precisely the view Williams claims is incoherent and unintelli-
gible. Consider, for example, the following passages from Quentin Smith: 
[T]ime is neither causation, motion, physicality, mentality, or anything 
else. Time is time. Time is a series of items related by primitive and 
irreducible relations of earlier, later and simultaneous and possessing 
monadic properties of futurity, presentness or pastness).5 
[T]he tenser acknowledges that events are B-related and that A-sentences 
imply facts about their B-relations .... The thesis the tenser wants to 
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establish is that A-sentences also convey information about the A-
properties of events. ([1993], 10) 
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Ned Markosian also understands the passage of time in a way that no B-
theorist would accept. According to Markosian: 
[T]here is a ... process by which times and events successively possess 
different A-properties. January 1st, 2000 is currently future, but it is 
becoming less and less remotely future all the time, and there is noth-
ing that anyone can do to halt or even to slow this process .... In what 
follows, I will refer to the process by which times and events succes-
sively possess different A-properties as the pure passage of time . ... As 
I see it, the A-property thesis and the pure passage of time thesis to-
gether constitute the metaphysical core of the view that time passes. 
([1993],835,836; emphasis added) 
Since, on Markosian's view, events or moments successively possess dif-
ferent A-properties, the pure passage of time involves something more than 
the time relations found in B-time. Thus the notion that time consists of both 
temporal relations and transitory temporal properties is a theory that many A-
theorists really want to maintain, and it reflects a metaphysical difference 
between what kinds of temporal entities exist in A- and B-time. 
Williams shows his B-theory bias by taking for granted that McTaggart, 
D. C. Williams, Grtinbaum, Smart, and others have effectively demonstrated 
the "myth" of passage as something extra, over and above B-relations (a 
point I shall return to below). However, since Markosian, Schlesinger (1994), 
Smith (1993, 1994), and other A-theorists have presented arguments that di-
rectly respond to the various dialectical challenges to A-time, Williams can-
not simply assume that the traditional way of drawing the distinction between 
A- and B-time is absurd. 
Nevertheless, Williams may object that the traditional way of distinguish-
ing A- and B-time does not mark a real metaphysical difference because "it is 
not evident how the shift of presentness from event to event in A-time differs 
from the transition from occurrence to occurrence in B-time" (380). By fur-
ther exploring how A-passage and B-succession might differ, we shall come to 
understand a further metaphysical difference between the two theories. 
We can begin to see how A- and B-time can be distinguished by consider-
ing what motivates the two theories, namely, the problem of change.6 Al-
though it is debatable whether or not time involves change, it is surely not 
debatable that change involves time. For if we are to understand how a single 
thing can have incompatible properties, and thus satisfy one essential ingre-
dient of change, we must in some way specify the different times at which it 
possesses those properties. For example, if a leaf changes its color from green 
to brown, it must first be green and then be brown, that is, it must be green at 
a time earlier than the time it is brown. Thus to explain the reality of change 
is to explain how a single thing can have incompatible properties successively, 
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or one before the other. What, then, is succession and the relations of earlier 
and later? Alternatively, how can we account for the difference between the 
temporal change of the color of a leaf, and the spatial "change" of, say, the 
color of a lawn from being green at one end and brown at the other? By 
turning to those questions, we shall be able to better understand the meta-
physical differences between A-time and B-time. First, however, a brief dis-
cussion of relations in general will be useful. 
With few exceptions, and until the discussions by Bradley (1897) and 
Russell (1903) around the turn of the century, relations were not recognized 
as constituting a category in their own right. Rather, the ontological ground 
of relations was believed to be in the nonrelational properties of the terms 
said to be related.7 Thus, for example, consider the relational statement that 
1. a is R to b 
On the traditional or monadistic account (to use Russell's phrase), a is R to b 
does not contain the relation R as a constituent. Rather, the objective facts 
represented by (1) are nonrelational. 
2. a is r1 and b is r2 
On this account of relations, the nonrelational properties, r1 and r2 are the 
foundation or ontological ground of the relation. For example, if Socrates is 
taller than Simmias, then he is so in virtue of the height that Socrates and 
Simmias each possess. In other words, on the reductionist view, relations do 
not have ontological status; they do not form a category of their own. For 
Russell, on the other hand, relations cannot be reduced to monadic properties 
of their terms. In particular, temporal relations are such that their terms can be 
related, that is, a can be earlier than b, even though neither a nor b exemplify 
any A-properties. 
To connect this brief discussion of relations with the issue at hand, I sug-
gest that a further fundamental difference between A- and B-time is that on 
the B-theory there are, whereas on some versions of the A-theory there are 
not, primitive temporal relations. Thus for some B-theorists, including Russell 
(1915), (the early) C. D. Broad (1912), (the early) C. Williams (1994), Oaklander 
(1984, 1998), and others, temporal relations are external in just this sense: 
They are primitive and unanalyzable relations indefinable in terms of tensed 
predicates and irreducible to tensed properties. On this version of B-time, the 
difference between spatial and temporal relations is an irreducible qualita-
tive difference, and it is a mistake to suppose that if time is the mere succes-
sion of events, then the change involved is exactly like the spatial "change" 
in the color of the lawn one observes as one walks from the front to the back. 
The relation that distinguishes temporal order is just different from any spa-
tial relation in the same sense that red and green are just different. I should 
note, however, that some B-theorists do not (and perhaps need not) construe 
the earlier/later relations as primitive. Detensers such as Grtinbaum (1963), 
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Mellor (1998), and Le Poidevin (1992), maintain that temporal relations are 
definable in terms of causal relations, and the direction of time and change is 
grounded in the direction of causality. For these philosophers, the crucial 
feature of B-time is not that B-relations are primitive or irreducible, but that 
they cannot be reduced to A-properties. 
For some A-theorists, on the other hand, temporal relations are analyzable 
in terms of A-properties, and they must be if there is to be genuine succession 
and temporal change. Thus, for example, McTaggart attempted to define "ear-
lier than" in terms of the notions of "past," present," and "future," and in his 
other positive reflections on time maintains that the direction of time and 
change (i.e., B-relations) depend upon the application of the A-series to the 
ordered, but nontemporal, C-series.8 Both of these claims support the idea 
that he did not countenance primitive temporal relations in his ontology 
even before he rejected the reality of time. 
More recently, John Bigelow has attempted to vindicate McTaggart's posi-
tive view by arguing that in order to make sense of the belief that time passes, we 
must take "as the more primitive notions those of the passage of time, of past, 
present and future, and not those of earlier and later, before and after. ... And 
I will try, in fact, to define earlier and later in terms of the passage of time, 
rather than the other way around" (1991, 3). Then, after providing a reductive 
analysis of the earlierllater relation, Bigelow asserts: 
[W]e thus have a way of meeting McTaggart's challenge. We can ex-
plain what makes the earlierllater ordering of events a temporal order-
ing, by showing that it derives from the prior, specifically temporal 
properties of pastness, presentness and futurity (1991, 13).9 
Clearly, by "prior" Bigelow does not mean temporally prior, but ontologically 
prior, and so the primitive temporal existents in his ontology are the intrinsic, 
nonrelational properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity, which, to-
gether with the hypothesis of possible worlds "make the earlierllater relation 
a temporal one" (1991, 3). Thus, contrary to Williams avowals, there is a 
fundamental difference between A-passage and B-succession and it concerns 
what categories of temporal entities exist. According to A-time (at least on 
one version), temporal relations are reducible to temporal properties (and the 
C-series or possible worlds). According to B-time, on the other hand, there are 
no nonrelational temporal properties; the only intrinsically temporal entities 
are relations. 
This difference between the A- and B-theories of transition and succession 
can also be understood by considering yet another version of the A-theory, 
namely, "presentism." To understand the motivation for presentism and how 
it is metaphysically distinct from the B-theory, we need to consider an appar-
ent peculiarity of temporal relations. On the one hand, temporal relations, 
like virtually all relations, involve existents as terms. 10 In order for a relation 
to relate there must be relata. Thus if John is taller than Paul, then both John 
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and Paul must exist. Of course, there may be relations that relate a thing to 
itself, such as identity, but even here, in order for the relation of identity to 
hold between a thing and itself, the entity in question must exist. On the other 
hand, it appears that in order for the earlierllater relation to obtain, at least 
one of the terms must either no longer or not yet exist. For example, the 1992 
Olympic Games are earlier than my writing this sentence and for that reason 
have, in some sense, ceased to exist, and the 2000 Olympic Games are later 
than my writing this sentence and for that reason do not yet exist. Thus the 
temporal relations of earlier and later both require and forbid existing terms. 
One way of understanding the problem of time, and the difference between 
the A- and B-time is by considering how A- and B-theories attempt to deal 
with this prima facie paradox concerning temporal relations. 
On the presentist version of the A-theory, "only the present exists." Thus, 
in response to the dilemma concerning temporal relations, the presentist main-
tains events that now exist are not in any way related to earlier or later events, 
since earlier or later events either no longer or do not yet exist; they are not 
around to stand in relation to anything. ll In other words, presentists avoid 
paradox by rejecting temporal telations as primitive existents and counte-
nancing only facts about the present. 
For the B-theorist, all events exist at the time they do; that is, they are 
located at the time they are, with the properties that they have, regardless of 
what time it is. Nevertheless, B-theorists can give an explanation of an event's 
coming to be and ceasing to be. On their reading, a headache's ceasing to 
exist over the interval tn -tn + 1 is its being located up to tn and thus making the 
present tense belief 'My headache exists (now)' true up to tn' and false at tn+l 
(and later). Similarly, a headache's beginning to exist at t is nothing more 
than its being located at t and not earlier, and thus making the present tense 
belief 'My headache exists (now)' true at t and false earlier. 12 
The issue is not whether A- or B-theories succeed in resolving a dilemma 
concerning time relations, although I clearly prefer the latter. The point I am 
emphasizing is that there is a fundamental difference between A-passage and 
B-succession since they offer different accounts of the ontological categories 
needed to explain the relational aspect of time. The presentist appeals to 
(nonrelational) present-tensed facts and denies primitive temporal relations, 
whereas the B-theorist accepts primitive temporal relations and rejects all 
tensed properties and facts. 
At the beginning of this paper I claimed that what Williams should have 
said, and to some extent has shown, is that there is only one true conception 
of time, namely, B-time. I want to conclude my essay by briefly explaining 
my rationale for that claim. Recall that there are basically two different ways 
in which A-time has been understood. Either the A-theory maintains that (1) 
succession is analyzable in terms of tensed facts and/or tensed properties, or 
that (2) in addition to a primitive, unanalyzable relation of succession, there are 
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A-properties that temporal items acquire and shed. Whichever interpretation 
one adopts, Williams writings tend to support the B-theory. Let me explain. 
In "A Bergsonian Response to McTaggart's Paradox" (1996b), Williams says: 
Now clearly there is only one kind of time: A-time if the A-theorists are 
correct or B-time if the B-theorists are correct. So when we employ 
Bergsonian intuition, we are immersing ourselves in only one kind of 
time. But suppose we try to imagine ourselves being immersed in some 
different kind of time. We find that we cannot do so. Perhaps I should 
say, I cannot do so. I draw a blank. All I get is an intuition of the kind of 
time that actually exists. If I imagine that the A-theory is true and that 
I am intuiting A-time, I cannot also imagine what it would be like to 
intuit B-time. And if I imagine that the B-theory is true and that I am 
intuiting B-time, I cannot also imagine what it would be like to intuit A-
time. I cannot, in short, imagine intuiting a different kind of passage (1-2). 
Suppose Williams is correct, and we can immerse ourselves in only one kind 
of time. What follows from that? Clearly, it is invalid for Williams to argue 
that since he has no intuition of two kinds of time, the distinction between A-
and B-time is spurious. Just because we cannot intuit time in both of these 
ways, it does not follow that there is no metaphysical distinction between the 
two theories any more than it follows that there is no metaphysical difference 
between the realist and the resemblance theories of the recurrence of qualities 
merely because we cannot intuit the difference between qualities as univer-
sals and qualities as particulars. 
A more plausible argument is that since we experience time as involving 
primitive B-relations and not primitive A-properties, the B-theory is correct. 
Interestingly, this phenomenological argument is one that Williams himself 
has made. In an earlier account of our experience of time he has said that we only 
experience B-time. Thus Williams has claimed that "contrary to A-theorists, 
... a correct account of our experience of time confirms the B-theory and not 
the A-theory. We do not experience the mind-independent A-properties that 
the A-theory says that events possess" ([1994a], 360). I take it that Williams 
would agree with his previous remarks concerning the phenomenology of A-
properties and B-relations even if he would disagree that there is a metaphysi-
cal difference between the two theories. Indeed, assuming that we should take 
the world as we experience it unless there are strong dialectical reasons to do 
otherwise, Williams should have said that the metaphysics ofB-time is thereby 
the way the world is. More importantly, the fact, if it is a fact, that we only 
experience B-relations does not render the dispute between A- and B-time a 
pseudo problem. 
Suppose we adopt the second interpretation of A-time and think of time as 
involving both temporal properties and temporal relations. For various reasons 
that he only hints at, Williams believes that the traditional A-theory "borders 
on the absurd" for he says that 
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if A-time is thought of as being added to B-time, then it will be thought 
of as a mysterious kind of movement against the backdrop of B-time, 
somewhat analogous to the movement of things in space. It will seem 
to B-theorists to be both unneeded, because there already is transition, 
namely, B-time, and contradictory, because it is the movement of time 
in time. 
Now, if Williams is right in his criticism of the traditional A-theory, and I 
think he is, then what follows is that we are left with only one kind of time, 
namely, B-time. For if we take away the moving now from the second interpre-
tation of A-time, then we are left with primitive temporal relations. Further-
more, Williams has pointed out important misinterpretations that have 
motivated A-theorists' rejection of the B-theory. Once these misconstruals are 
unmasked, the dialectical difficulties with the A-theory spelled out, and the 
phenomenology of time understood to be relational, the B-theory can be 
judged to be adequate to the reality, and our experience, of time. 
But is Williams' B-theory bias justified? Is there something unbelievable 
about A-time containing both the time relations of B-time and the modalities 
of past, present, and future? It is not my intention to pursue that question in 
this paper since I have done so extensively elsewhere (Oaklander and Smith 
[1994], Oaklander [1994, 1996]). Nevertheless, I think I have demonstrated 
that there are important metaphysical differences between alternative ver-
sions of the A-theory and the B-theory, and have given some reason to think 
that Williams is implicitly (and in my view correctly) sympathetic with the B-
theory. That some distinction between the two theories really exists is further 
suggested by the fact that the differences I have explained seem to connect 
with other important issues in metaphysics. For example, William Lane Craig 
(1996b) has argued that the A-theory implies "the reality ofthe transcenden-
tal ego, or self. Just as there is an objective present, so there must also be a 
substantival self' (261; emphasis added). Furthermore, William Carter, Scott 
Hestevold (1994), and Trenton Merricks (1995) have argued that the tensed 
theory implies an endurance (or continuant) view of identity through time 
and the tenseless theory implies a perdurance (or temporal parts) view (cf. Le 
Poidevin, 1992). Moreover, if the B-theory is correct and there are no tensed 
properties, then the tenser-detenser debate has clear implications for those 
working in the philosophy of language who argue that the semantics of tem-
poral indexicals imply that there are A-properties. If the two theories do have 
these and other implications, then philosophical progress on fundamental 
topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of language (as well as other areas) 
can be made by continuing the debate between A- and B-time. 13 Whether the 
A- and B-theories do in fact have all of the different implications that they 
appear to have is a question that lies beyond the scope of this paper. Be that 
as it may, I think I have shown, in answer to the question of this paper, that 
yes, there are indeed metaphysical differences between A- and B-time. 
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Williams says about the B-theory are themselves ambiguous and may lead to just those 
misinterpretations of B-time that Williams sought to avoid. For example, he says that "B-
time does not just consist of permanent facts; [i.e., facts expressed by B-statements such as 
'Kirsten and Lee marry (tenseless) on 27 February 1993'] it consists also of transition 
between the events that make up the facts, and this transition makes B-time 'dynamic' (379). 
The notion of "permanent" facts suggests that the fact expressed by "Kirsten and Lee marry 
(tenseless) on 27 February 1993" always exists. Of course, B-facts are not permanent in that 
sense since they do not exist at every time. As I have argued elsewhere (1984), B-facts do not 
exist in time at all, although all tokens of a B-sentence type have a permanent truth-value in 
that they are always true or always false. 
'This passage is from a draft of Smith (1998), and in private correspondence Smith ex-
pressed his full endorsement of it. 
6For a fuller treatment of the problem of change, see C. D. Broad (1959), chap. 2; Le 
Poidevin (1992), 13-23; Smith and Oaklander (1995),57-65; and Oaklander (1996, 1998a). 
7For a penetrating discussion of this reductionist gambit, see Wilson (1995). The classic 
critique of the monadistic account is found in Russell (1938, chap. 26). 
8McTaggart's definition of "earlier than" in terms of A properties is: 'The term P is earlier 
than the term Q, if it is ever past while Q is present, or present while Q is future" (McTaggart, 
[1959], 271). For a critical discussion of McTaggart's definition, see Gale ([1968], 90-1). 
9For a criticism of Bigelow's response to McTaggart, see Oaklander (1994b). It should be 
noted that Bigelow has changed his views on time and now adopts a variant of present-
ism (1996). 
IOSome philosophers maintain that intentionality is an "abnormal" relation between a mental 
act and its object since it can connect an existent with what does not exist. See, for example, 
Grossmann (1983). 
IISee Zimmerman (1996). 
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12To this it might be objected that since the knowledge of my headache ceasing to exist 
requires that the tensed beliefs "My headache exists (now)" and "My headache did exist" are 
both true (at different times), there must be tensed facts to account for their truth. The 
inference, however, is fallacious. For if a belief or judgment is indexical, as it is if it is tensed, 
then its truth conditions are token-reflexive. So all it takes to make a token of the tensed belief 
"My headache exists (now)" true is that the headache occurs simultaneously with the belief. 
And all it takes to make a token of the tensed belief, "My headache did exist" true is that the 
headache ended before I had the belief (or that the belief is held after the end of the headache). 
'3For a discussion of ways in which the debate connects with issues in the philosophy of 
religion, the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science, 
see, Oaklander and Smith (1994), 1-14. The connection between time and identity is ex-
plored in Oaklander (1992), and time and freedom in Oaklander (1998b). 
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